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Abstract 
 
Researchers misunderstand their role in creating ethical problems when they allow dogmas to 
purportedly divorce scientists and scientific practices from the values that they embody. 
Cortina (2019), Edwards (2019), and Powell (2019) help us clarify and further develop our 
position by responding to our critique of, and alternatives to, this misleading separation. In 
this rebuttal, we explore how the desire to achieve the separation of facts and values is 
unscientific on the very terms endorsed by its advocates—this separation is refuted by 
empirical observation. We show that positivists like Cortina and Edwards offer no rigorous 
theoretical or empirical justifications to substantiate their claims, let alone critique ours. 
Following Powell, we point to how classical pragmatism understands ‘purpose’ in scientific 
pursuits while also providing an alternative to the dogmas of positivism and related 
philosophical positions. In place of dogmatic, unscientific cries about an abstract and 
therefore always-unobservable ‘reality’, we invite all organizational scholars to join us in 
shifting the discussion about quantitative research towards empirically grounded scientific 
inquiry. This makes the ethics of actual people and their practices central to quantitative 
research, including the thoughts, discourse, and behaviors of researchers who are always in 
particular places doing particular things. We propose that quantitative researchers can thus 
start to think about their research practices as a kind of work, rather than having the status of 
a kind of dogma. We conclude with some implications that this has for future research and 
education, including the relevance of research and research methods. 
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“Old ideas give way slowly; for they are more than abstract logical forms and categories. 
They are habits, predispositions, deeply engrained attitudes…” (Dewey, 1910).  
 
“In a changing world, old habits… need modification, no matter how good they have been… 
Efficiency in following a beaten path has then to be converted into breaking a new road 
through strange lands” -- Dewey, 1922 
 
“The task, however, is enormous enough, for it involves not simply breaking down passive 
barriers such as those of distance in space and time and vernacular, but those fixed attitudes 
of custom and status in which our selves are embedded. Any self is a social self, but it is 
restricted to the group whose roles it assumes” -- Mead, 1925 
 
 
In a recent article we described and advocated for new ways to understand the ethical 
dimensions of quantitative research practices (Zyphur & Pierides, 2017). One of our positions 
was that in order to take ethics seriously, researchers need to understand scientific practices 
as value-laden instead of value-free. We were challenging the idea that quantitative 
researchers should only discuss ethics in the narrow terms given by normative ethics (e.g., 
utilitarianism, virtue ethics). Our aim was to recast the discussion about quantitative research 
and ethics to include a variety of ways in which these are inter-related by offering a more 
expansive view of ethics and ethical dilemmas associated with quantitative research methods. 
In particular we wanted researchers to think about everything they do as ethics-laden by 
considering the purpose and consequences of their actions. This includes how variables are 
defined, decisions about which analytic strategy to use, what counts as observation or 
measurement, and importantly the kind of people who do quantitative research and the 
purpose of it. Based on this, we focused on how researchers could understand and deal with 
the inherently normative dimensions of their work. In response, Cortina (2019), Edwards 
(2019), and Powell (2019) offered a range of views on our article. 
Powell (2019) supports our effort and agrees with our philosophical orientation but 
wants us to say more about the value of the pragmatist philosophy that underpins our article 
(see Zyphur, Pierides, & Roffe, 2015), fearing that a failure to clarify this could lead to our 
pragmatism being mistaken for something else (e.g., social constructionism, etc.). Cortina 
(2019) and Edwards (2019), quantitative researchers who write in defense of positivism, 
misunderstand our views as unempirical or subjectivist, subsequently fearing that our 
proposal may lead to an ‘anything goes’ approach to research. We respond by providing all 
quantitative researchers with a justification for abandoning such a positivist position and we 
advance a pragmatist alternative that they can use to more coherently and more meaningfully 
address the relationship between values and action. We continue to maintain that when 
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researchers use quantitative methods ethically, any foundations they deploy should stand up 
to empirical scrutiny in the form of an inquiry into their uses and practical effects.  
Two insights guide us. First, quantitative researchers have an empirical orientation 
that values the testing of beliefs or logical propositions against experience. Thus, empirical 
evidence is valued in a way that requires positivists to take seriously empirical critique, even 
one that rebuts positivism itself. This insight leads us to consider scientific practices on 
empirical terms, with which quantitative researchers must engage if they want to remain 
faithful to their own values. Our account shows that the positivism which Cortina and 
Edwards espouse is based on weak or unstated theories that are rebutted by substantial 
empirical research (e.g., see Latour & Woolgar, 1986; Shapin & Schaffer, 1985; Shapin, 
1995; also Hackett, Amsterdamska, Lynch, & Wajcman, 2008), including from organization 
science (e.g., Farjoun, Ansell & Boin, 2015). As we conclusively point out, their beliefs and 
propositions are never subjected to the same standards of theoretical rigor and empirical 
verification that they openly advocate for others—as we argue, their positivist doctrines 
cannot withstand even weak standards of empirical evidence. 
As their positivism is not based on empirical observation, it is a kind of ‘positivist 
dogma’ that is committed to an abstract reality that never exists in practice. Quantitative 
researchers who continue to adhere to this dogma become unscientific by failing to 
acknowledge, let alone see, how they are active participants in the production of what they 
abstractly call ‘reality’. Second, this insight is useful because it helps us understand why 
researchers who adhere to a positivist dogma will only be able to understand how values are 
embedded in scientific practices if they can break their habits of conceptually separating facts 
from values, and logic from ethics. These are habits that have developed over hundreds of 
years and are a product of a rich history that leads adherents of the positivist dogma to 
unknowingly separate and subordinate ethics to a logic of statistics and probability (for an 
historical analysis from the 1600s to the present day, see Zyphur & Pierides, 2019). This 
logic-then-ethics priority exists in many papers and editorials in business and management 
journals. If researchers continue to unwittingly reproduce these habits, then an inquiry into 
ethics is not possible, and positivists will be stuck in their current position of basing their 
practices on a set of propositions or ideas that are unscientific on their own terms. 
 Rigorous theory and empirical findings that profoundly rebut the positivist dogma do 
exist (e.g., Kuhn, 1961, 1970a, 1970b), but these seem to be misunderstood or dismissed as 
‘constructivist’ by positivists—perhaps because they are still unfamiliar with an established 
agenda for the study of business, ethics, and society that is critical of such dichotomies 
(Freeman & Gillbert, 1992). Similarly, within management and organization theory, existing 
views critical of positivism often come from outside the quantitative research community and 
get little traction in it (e.g., Adler, Forbes, & Willmott, 2007; Alvesson, 2003; Alvesson & 
Sandberg, 2011; Calás & Smircich, 1999; Newton, Deetz, & Reed, 2011), perhaps because 
positivists think that these views are inadequately scientific (e.g., Donaldson, 2005; Hunt, 
2005; McKelvey, 1999).  
Whatever the case, as we show in this paper, the positivist dogma is unscientific on its 
own terms and prevents meaningful inquiry into ethics because its adherents fail to see how 
they help to actively produce what they abstractly, unscientifically, and uncritically call 
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‘reality’ (as if this simplistic utterance was a reasonable way to finish a debate rather than 
indicating the need for scientific inquiry and discussion about what people are doing when 
they speak this way). Thus, our difficult task is to critique positivism from inside its own 
logic, while offering an alternative that will lead to scientifically rigorous ways of 
understanding research and enable a new focus on ethics. This is difficult because positivism, 
like dogmatism but unlike an experimental science that actively inquires into its own 
production and the effects of its implementations, is self-reinforcing by setting the terms for 
evaluating empirical evidence rather than allowing itself to be subjected to empirical critique. 
The positivism we examine is therefore deeply troubling because: 1) it fails to provide 
adequate terms for quantitative researchers to engage with ethics, other than to treat it as an 
afterthought of logic (for details, see Zyphur & Pierides, 2019); and 2) it inhibits quantitative 
researchers from inquiring about the conditions that produce this failure. To illustrate the 
problems with this type of positivism, we begin by describing the foundations for the science 
advocated by Cortina and Edwards, which allows us to then link the commitments they 
expect of quantitative researchers to various impasses that these foundations cause—by an 
‘impasse’ we mean problems caused by positivist foundations that cannot be understood or 
addressed on the terms of the foundations themselves. After our critique, and to provide 
terms that will allow quantitative researchers to engage with ethics, we begin with a simple 
and hopefully obvious assertion that quantitative research is a kind of work done by people.  
Although some quantitative researchers may not endorse all of our conclusions, our 
notion of research as work should be an intuitive place for all organization scholars to start. If 
work is an important topic (Barley, 1996, 2001; Okhuysen et al., 2013), then the work that 
researchers do is by definition within the purview of that scholarship. By treating research as 
work, we hope positivists can view their thoughts, discourse, and practices as only some of 
many possible ways of working in the world, and abandon feelings of obligation to mimic or 
draw contrast with the ways they think scientific work is done elsewhere—especially 
caricatures of physics or other ‘hard sciences’. 
To encourage a rigorous yet practical science that takes ethics more seriously, we 
offer a classical pragmatist approach to inquiry that underpins our thinking—most influenced 
by John Dewey and George Herbert Mead. Our approach is interested in collectively and 
scientifically addressing matters of concern (as in Koffman, 2018; Latour, 2004). To be 
crystal clear, it is incorrect to read a realist-subjectivist dualism into this approach, as 
Edwards (2019) and Cortina (2019) did with our initial article (i.e., Zyphur & Pierides, 2017). 
Classical pragmatism is staunchly scientific, emphasizing that scientific methods should 
serve as tools to guide practical action, with ethical ends in view. Indeed, pragmatism is more 
rigorous than positivism in this sense because it emphasizes that foundational commitments 
should be more than simply matters of belief; they should be empirically evaluated through 
inquiry (Dewey, 1922, 1929; James, 1898, 1907; Mead, 1899, 1929). 
Building on pragmatist organizational scholarship (e.g., Elkjaer & Simpson, 2011; 
Kelemen & Rumens, 2013; Lorino, 2018; Freeman, 2004; Simpson, 2009; Wicks & Freeman, 
1998), our pragmatist approach fosters an interest in ethics, which cannot be separated from 
action (Ezzamel & Willmott, 2014). The approach we are developing emphasizes situated 
practical action which engages with ethics via an interest in doing and studying research as 
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work. We conclude by calling for broader inquiry into quantitative research in order to better 
understand how it is done, who does it and how to defend it—but without the unscientific 
positivist baggage that cannot be defended without becoming dogmatic. This, we hope will 
lead to a variety of beneficial outcomes, including more relevant research and researchers. 
 
Problems with Positivism 
As paradigmatic cases of the type of positivism with which we take issue, we start by 
discussing papers by Edwards (2011) and Cortina and Landis (2011), which are exemplars of 
the kind of positivist dogma that causes various problems yet is uncritically voiced in high-
impact journals such as Organizational Research Methods. We show how their work is based 
on beliefs and commitments that are not justified by the kind of rigorous scientific theory and 
empirical observations the authors themselves endorse. In so doing, we continue our dialogue 
with these authors while concluding with an encouraging note for any researchers who might 
want to use our work as a reference point for abandoning the brand of positivism that these 
authors espouse—to replace it with the more rigorous and ethics-oriented pragmatist 
quantitative research that we further develop in this paper. 
To begin, Edwards (2011) critiques ‘formative’ measurement and statistical models 
by appealing to a critical realism that favors their ‘reflective’ analogues. For him, “reflective 
measurement[s] are consistent with a critical realist ontology,” but “formative measurement 
[such as measures of socio-economic status] signifies an ontology… that could be 
characterized as constructivist, operationalist, or instrumentalist rather than realist” (p. 13). 
Edwards’s basic point is that psychometric concepts mapped to his ontology are consistent 
with reflective measures and therefore these are superior to formative measures, which seem 
constructivist. However, to argue why his ideas and methods are superior, no testable theory 
or empirical findings are offered outside of the author’s and his community’s insistence on 
positivist doctrines. If science requires testable theories and empirical evidence, his position 
is unscientific. Furthermore, if his positivism is not accepted by the reader, his arguments are 
unpersuasive and, instead, merely seek to constrain research practices to specific types of 
‘measurement’ in order to satisfy his type of positivism. 
To illustrate Edwards’s difficulties, he notes “[t]he entities that constructs describe are 
real in the sense that they have the capacity to influence one another, as explained by 
theoretical models… That is, constructs refer to entities that exist in the real world, 
independent of attempts by the researcher to measure them” (p. 11; see also Edwards, 2019). 
This is neither a testable theory nor does it rely on empirical evidence. Instead, Edwards is 
merely defining the brand of positivism that he espouses, so in response to the question, 
“[w]hich perspective is more defensible?,” Edwards can only say, “[a]lthough opinions on 
this matter might differ… [an appeal to positivism] seems eminently reasonable.” 
In these and other passages, Edwards implies that those who reject his positivism are 
unreasonable, but he never provides any rigorous theory or empirical evidence to substantiate 
this. Indeed, if Edwards’s view is reasonable, then this prompts a range of scientific questions 
which his type of positivism will have trouble addressing. For example, by what social and 
testable process did his beliefs become reasonable, and what does such a social process say 
about his positivism? If all of reality is at stake, why is ‘reasonableness’ a useful criterion for 








For published version see: 
Zyphur, M. J., & Pierides, D. C. (2019). Making Quantitative Research Work: From Positivist Dogma to 
Actual Social Scientific Inquiry. Journal of Business Ethics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-019-04189-6  
adjudicating on such matters? Where do notions of reasonableness come from? Edwards 
offers no answers to these questions and therefore offers no compelling arguments, only 
recapitulations of his beliefs and the statistical practices that purportedly follow from them. 
The implication is that Edwards offers no scientifically valid reasons for his approach, and 
thus his critiques are not even grounded in the very science that he espouses.  
Furthermore, Edwards offers no inquiry into the ethical implications of his proposals. 
For example, a paradigmatic case of a formative measure is socio-economic status (SES), 
which is relevant to research and social action that bears on questions of social justice. If 
Edwards’s recommendations are taken, what is to come of this approach to understanding 
social class and inequality? Edwards says nothing on this point or related issues that have a 
direct bearing on the ethics of the research practices that he is recommending. 
Next, consider the article by Cortina and Landis (2011), who describe quantitative 
research as an act of translation, leading them to recommend null hypothesis significance 
testing (NHST) over effect sizes, in part, because NHST “satisfies objectivity requirements of 
science” by being based on “externally determined criteria” (p. 333-336). In brief, the authors 
note that both approaches involve arbitrary cut-offs, but the former is better able to manage 
research practice by leading researchers to engage in a similar activity, with a key purpose 
being “[ruling] out chance as a viable explanation” for observed results (p. 336). Although 
the authors never define objectivity or chance, they imply that both can be controlled by 
using specific habitualized practices of a research community (i.e., NHST), which is perhaps 
why they desire for everyone to follow similar procedures (see also Landis & Cortina, 2015). 
However, the authors never offer a testable scientific theory or empirical support for 
how the reliance on a community, and its habits, accomplishes the goal of objectivity and the 
elimination of chance, much less why keeping everyone engaged in common procedures is 
the best way for science to proceed. These points are crucial because if “we as a science 
choose our epistemology” (Cortina & Landis, 2011, p. 345), then how can objectivity or 
chance be understood as anything other than reproductions of a community’s own concepts 
that it adopts for its own uses? It is unsurprising that objectivity and chance can be controlled 
if a community develops its own understanding of these in relation to its own practices. A 
social scientific question is how this occurs, and an empirical question is to what extent 
particular notions of objectivity and chance—and practices associated with them—may lead 
to useful ways of doing social scientific research and conceptualizing ethics? Or, what 
happens when unexpected events or ‘surprises’ occur—events that were previously 
unknowable from within a chosen epistemology? 
Like Edwards (2011), Cortina and Landis (2011) offer no social scientific support for 
their recommended approach and, instead, merely recapitulate their core values. Along the 
way, they rely on the notion of a community to justify their position, but they do not seem to 
take the implications of this reliance seriously when recommending how to practice what is 
supposed to be an objective social science. In the end, the reader is left with a manifesto: 
“[e]nforce the law… [with] gatekeepers,” (p. 347). What the authors fail to clarify is how this 
kind of policing relates to objectivity and chance other than as community-defined values, 
and why any one practice or notion of objectivity or chance should be chosen outside of its 
status as a kind of communal habit. The result is that the authors’ claims are not critically 
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interrogated or subjected to the same requirements of rigorous social scientific theory and 
empirical inquiry that they themselves note should be the pillars of science. Furthermore, 
how their proposals might relate to ethical issues is nowhere to be found. 
In sum, positivists who employ this type of reasoning avoid subjecting their own core 
beliefs and commitments to the rigorous theoretical and empirical interrogation they demand 
of others—indeed, we will show that many of their views are untestable under their own 
logic. For a community of scientists, the consequence is that many papers on quantitative 
research methods explicitly or implicitly espouse beliefs and practices that are unscientific on 
their own terms, making their work seem more like dogma than the kind of organization 
science they desire. In the next section, we unpack what purportedly grounds such positivism 
so that its foundations can be understood in relation to empirical findings. 
 
Foundations And Impasses In Positivist Quantitative Research 
Quantitative researchers typically emphasize the importance of concepts such as 
objectivity, validity, or bias that are defined in relation to true inferences—the Cortina (2019) 
and Edwards (2019) critiques of our prior work are replete with such ideas. The foundations 
for this logic involve a theory of knowledge (i.e., an epistemology) that has two main parts: 
1) a theory of meaning where substantive theories, hypotheses, models, and/or data represent 
worldly states of affairs; and, 2) a theory of truth or knowledge where these emerge if 
substantive theories, hypotheses, models, and/or data correspond to these states of affairs. 
This epistemology relies on a theory of ‘being’ or ‘reality’ (i.e., an ontology) that stipulates 
the existence of two fundamentally different kinds of things: 1) a singular reality that is the 
object of researchers’ study; and, 2) researchers with minds and language that can represent 
this reality and test correspondence among it and its representations (see Hacking, 1983; 
Rorty, 1979). With this logic, practices such as hypothesis testing are meant to assess how 
well representations correspond to data that also serve to represent a singular reality. 
These foundations help organize the practice of research, but they create impasses that 
have no clear solution for the positivists who uphold them. In general, the problem is that 
these foundations say nothing about their origins or how they relate to research practices and 
ethics in the communities that use them. For example, with the same data, a psychologist may 
purport to represent personality; in sociology, social structure; in economics, choice (as in 
Parmigiani & Howard-Grenville, 2011). A ‘theory of measurement’ can describe differences 
here, but this only means that different researchers think the world is made of very different 
things, with no guidance on which approach to use. Also, to test correspondence of data and a 
theory, different and incommensurable tools can be used (Kuhn, 1961, 1970b), such as 
regression or qualitative comparative analysis with different standards for correspondence 
(Fiss, 2007). On the ethics and consequences of such decisions and versions of reality, the 
foundations are mute because they require that the meaning of data vis-à-vis conceptions of 
reality and the determination of correspondence are already settled and go unquestioned.  
The impasse here is that a representation or a tool to test correspondence is only 
comparable to preexisting representations with preexisting tools—rather than any kind of 
abstract ‘reality’—illustrating a “stumbling block of empiricists in trying to account for 
science on an empirical basis” (Dewey, 1929, p. 140). Powell (2019) is thus correct to draw 
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our attention to an examination of “ourselves, asking if we are the right people for the job, 
working in the right places, carrying the right tools”. The foundations on which Cortina 
(2019) and Edwards (2019) rely are ahistorical and they ignore the ethical consequences of 
persisting with them; tautologically speaking, they say that things are this way because this is 
how they are, and nothing else. No insight is given into the practical implications of choosing 
among different, incommensurable representations or tools, and the vast ethical implications 
of these choices seem willfully ignored. 
For example, statistical tools are often justified using ‘Monte Carlo’ procedures that 
simulate data to test how the tools work (e.g., Aguinis, Pierce, & Culpepper, 2009). Such 
procedures specify a fictitious world as a parameterized model that is used to generate data 
that are then used to assess the tools. This forms a closed loop in which researchers literally 
invent everything to recommend tools for representation and correspondence. In turn, outside 
of simulated worlds, how can researchers know whether they have “true” representations and 
accurate tests of correspondence, much less useful and ethical versions of them? Their 
methods dictate that their representations are evaluated against each other with methods they 
invent for themselves, so nowhere along the way is an abstract ‘reality’ to be found, just 
more representations and self-made methods. If statistical tools are used, the world appears to 
be statistical ‘in nature’, if other tools are used then it appears in their image, and such 
method-made-images are all the positivists ever have. This is partly why it is unscientific for 
positivists to argue for the singular ‘reality’ of their constructs and methods, because if they 
believe in these then it is a foregone conclusion that the images produced will be correct in 
their eyes—this is a self-reinforcing belief and cannot be disconfirmed, because their 
practices produce images of reality, not the reverse. 
A key problem here, or perhaps a key solution, is that any observation can be made to 
fit a positivist’s way of representing and testing correspondence, because these are practices 
rather than something ‘foundational’ about ‘nature’ (Kuhn 1961, 2012). In the philosophy of 
science this issue has been treated in relation to ‘auxiliary hypotheses’, ‘webs of belief’, 
‘meaning variance’, and observations being ‘theory laden’ (e.g., Feyerabend, 1962, 1975; 
Hanson, 1958; Knorr-Cetina, 1981; Lakatos, 1970; Quine, 1969). However, the point is that, 
to represent and test correspondence, there is “no wholesale constraint derived from the 
nature of [scientific] objects” (Rorty, 1982, p. 165). The foundations for positivist research 
struggle with such ambivalence because “the experimental method can only be applied where 
a reality which is not called into question sets the conditions to which any hypothetical 
solution must conform. The scientist puts a question to nature, and so far as the answer to that 
question is concerned, nature [itself] cannot be problematic” (Mead, 1929, p. 78). 
Unfortunately, this problem is evident in all three comments on our earlier article. By 
claiming that “reality [is] out there for us to study”, Cortina (2019) renders this reality 
abstract and disconnected from the process of scientific inquiry. Edwards (2019) argues that 
“although the methods used in QR arguably impact representations of reality, they do not 
create that reality itself, which exists independently of researchers”, whereas Powell (2019) 
argues that “removing or reforming traditional QR will not solve the problems of the human 
condition because these problems are not caused by a research method”. Though we agree 
with many of Powell’s points, here we think he joins Cortina and Edwards in failing to 
recognize the performativity of quantitative research and its relational character. As an 
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example, many argue that the quantitative practices of economics provides justification for 
vast inequalities and the financialization of social institutions (see Chambost, Lenglet, & 
Tadjeddine, 2018), which has a different kind of value-laden ‘reality’ under different 
approaches. 
Even organizational research shows that nature is pluralistic in this way, and different 
researchers ascribe different realities to different kinds of things (Hassard & Wolfram Cox, 
2013; Morgan, 2006; Morgan & Smircich, 1980). Such plurality adds flexibility to research 
practices, but it also means that any notion of reality is inseparable from the activities that 
produce representations of it—in the example above, using the same data, psychologists can 
represent psyches, sociologists structures, and economists choices. The result is a pluralistic 
world, with inexhaustible ways of describing it and using it. This is because representations 
are always descriptions that are produced by people at work, and researchers invoke these as 
practices for their own purposes. In turn, reality is “ontologically multiple” (see Law, 2008, 
p. 637; Mol, 2002), with the observed qualities of scientific objects (including subjects) tied 
to the productive acts of researchers at work—which changes incommensurably over time 
and varies incommensurably across communities of researchers (Kuhn, 1970b). 
This observation should be taken seriously by anyone claiming to be a scientist, not 
least because it is supported by an avalanche of empirical research. Organization researchers 
note that “frameworks for interpreting experience in organizations are generally resistant to 
experience… disagreements over the meaning of history are possible, and different groups 
develop alternative stories that interpret the same experience quite differently” (Levitt & 
March, 1988, p. 234). This leads to the inference that “[i]ndividuals are continuously 
committed to recreating the world in accordance with their own” (Nonaka, 1994, p. 17). As in 
other forms of work, different researchers encounter different realities, because “[r]oles tell 
organization members how to reason about the problems and decisions that face them: where 
to look for appropriate and legitimate informational premises and goal (evaluative) premises, 
and what techniques to use in processing these premises” (Simon, 1991, p. 126-127).  
Statistical practices are tools that bring different images of companies, markets, and 
societies into being (see work in Klein & Morgan, 2001; see also MacKenzie, 2006; Miller & 
O’Leary, 1987; Morgan, 1988; Poovey, 1995; Porter, 1991, 1992a, 1992b, 1993, 1997; 
Power, 2004). Adopting metrics and methods of standardization changes how these objects—
always social and material—are experienced, creating copies of the realities that are adopted 
(see work in Howlett & Morgan, 2011; Porter, 2007). New types of people and objects come 
into being when new measures, classifications, and expertise emerge to make sense of people 
and objects in ways consistent with the same tools that are purported to merely represent 
them (Eyal, 2013; Hacking, 2002; Miller & Rose, 2008; Rose, 1989, 1998). The rather 
obvious, albeit ironic, implication is that the type of positivism we critique directs its 
researchers to avoid comparing their representations to the impartial reality they seek to 
uphold; they are comparing their representations to other representations using tools that they 
have created for themselves (Hacking, 1992a, 1992b). Embracing this type of positivism, 
researchers become unscientific by failing to see how they are active participants in the 
production of what they abstractly and unscientifically call ‘reality’. Indeed, it is their 
commitment to their own abstractions that leads them to misunderstand that they are doing 
this. 
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Broadly speaking, practicing research with any approach creates the kinds of images 
and objects that researchers were looking for from the outset (Morgan, 2006), even if the 
researchers engaging in the practice overlook this. Therefore, instead of Simon’s (1991) idea 
that a “change in representation implies change… in organizational knowledge and skills” (p. 
133), we advocate being open to Shapin’s (1995) idea that “[s]hifting judgments are possibly 
best read as reliable reflections of shifting realities” (p. 291). This way of understanding 
science means that the foundations of positivist research only apply when a representation 
and tool for testing correspondence are already in place, and therefore they will often not be 
useful for scientific understandings of their own implementation. In turn, this underscores our 
focus on how quantitative research can be understood in light of the need for rigorous 
scientific theory and empirical research that is ethically oriented. 
Our discussion now begins to answer this question in a manner that is consistent with 
Powell’s (2019) discussion of Jamesian sub-worlds: different research communities have 
different practices for representing and assessing correspondence, and these practices have no 
necessary or singular link with their own purported foundations (Davidson, 1973; Hacking, 
2002; Kuhn, 1961). Although activities of representation and correspondence are debated and 
always in flux, the positivist doctrine we are critiquing fails to offer insight into this process 
or into ethics because these things exist in the context of a research community’s activity 
rather than abstractions such as ‘objectivity’, ‘validity’, ‘reality’, and the like. Indeed, “the 
question of what ‘X’ refers to is a sociological matter, a question of how best to make sense 
of a community’s linguistic behavior,” as well as its other practices, all of which are 
functions of historical, social, and material contingency rather than some singular reality 
underlying foundations (Rorty, 1982, p. xxiv). As such, quantitative research and positivist 
discourse seem less related to facts and more related to habits and values. 
In sum, conceptually separating researchers from their notions of reality and its ethics 
creates impasses, the most important of which is a block on the possibility of scientifically 
inquiring into the separation itself because positivism is partly defined by it (even though this 
is empirically unjustified). Researchers are expected to accept a sort of tautological and 
sophomoric ‘it is what it is’, while institutionally powerful actors rely on enforcing their own 
values via the control of academic knowledge production—consider that the editors of 
Organizational Research Methods, Cortina included, have all been trained in quantitative 
micro-level psychology (Aguinis, Ramani & Villamor, 2019), where positivists rule the roost. 
Is this what a pluralist social scientific community of organizational researchers should look 
like? Not only do the foundations of positivism fail to overcome this self-created and self-
imposed impasse, they also fail to offer tools to help understand this problem. What might 
motivate positivists or ground practical action, if not the dogmatic assertion of the circular 
logic that we exposed above? Why do they maintain a deep commitment to abstractions 
rather than empirically looking into their own logic and ethics?  
Our argument thus far suggests how these issues hinge on features of science that 
cannot be simplified with foundations. Instead, a discussion is needed of what is involved in 
research, and how research is directed—its purpose. Science has never been about lone 
scientists representing a singular reality—the simplistic, unhelpful figure offered by Cortina 
(2019) and Edwards (2019). Science is people engaged in social and material or, better, 
socio-material activities that emerge and carry meanings in relation to a community and its 
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values—whether organization scientists, physicists, or others. We next articulate new 
opportunities for quantitative researchers who want to leave behind the impasses sustained by 
Edwards, Cortina and other positivists. 
 
From Positivist Dogma to Actual Social Scientific Inquiry 
Quantitative research is work that is done by people (Shapin, 2008). Like anyone else 
at work, researchers speak to each other, write, think, and physically act in ways that must be 
learned in material environments (Dewey, 1922, 1929). This learning and the environments, 
discourse, and thoughts associated with it have evolved over time (Poovey, 1998). This 
evolution and its results are profound, but they are also mundane because research is merely a 
part of the ongoing activity of people at work, with material environments and ways of 
working that are made by and for researchers themselves (Hacking, 1992a, 1992b, 2002; 
Shapin & Schaffer, 1985). Such productions include abstract concepts such as ‘objectivity’, 
‘validity’, ‘bias’ ‘chance’, or ‘reality’, as well as physical objects such as academic buildings, 
faculty clubs, coffee shops, surveys, questionnaires, computers, statistical software, and the 
data and findings that are the products of this work. The result is that no part of the research 
process escapes the situated embodiment of the researcher at work, meaning there is no free-
standing objectivity, reality, or chance, only different ways of speaking, writing, and 
otherwise working amongst other people and material things (Shapin, 2010). There is never 
an abstract ‘reality’ that resembles this concept when it is used. There are always only 
particular acts of talking, thinking, and collaboratively producing quantitative research and 
its results. 
Therefore, we challenge the positivist researchers we have cited (and those we have 
not) to explain things like objectivity, validity, bias, chance, or reality in ways that transcend 
the practices of researchers at work and the communal nature of the way that these concepts 
are defined and deployed in actual material practices rather than abstractly. The empirical 
concern here is that positivists cannot do this without abstraction, because embodied practices 
in material environments are all that humans ever do—including thinking or ‘perception’, 
which are active practices that must be learned (Dewey, 1922, 1929). In turn, to generate 
representations or notions of objectivity, it does not seem to be the case that the metaphorical 
emperor has no clothes, it seems more accurate to say that the clothes have no emperor. 
Therefore, although our conception of research as work should not be too contentious 
(see also Kilduff, Mehra, & Dunn, 2011; Tsoukas & Knudsen, 2003; Van Maanen, 2011), it 
presents difficulties for positivists because it demands that they situate themselves as part of 
the ongoing production of their own concepts and representations as work—the irony, of 
course, is that positivists who claim to be empirical social scientists seem to lack the social 
and the empirical. Crucially, understanding research as work inhibits attempts to reach 
beyond it via abstraction. If positivists are going to be empirical scientists—even belittling 
others who do not follow their ideology—then it follows that they would not want to avoid 
this process of inquiry or its consequences, lest they be forced to critique themselves. 
In turn, it is unsurprising that reactions by positivists to observations and statements 
like ours often embody dismissiveness if not outright hostility or retrogression (Cortina, 
2019; Edwards, 2019). Generally, their reactions are derived from a concern about the 
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prospect of a science without the foundations we critiqued previously, as if theirs is the only 
way to organize research in a principled fashion (e.g., Edwards, 2011). This reaction is 
understandable for researchers who have been trained to uphold their doctrine rather than 
engage in theorizing and empirical inquiry that includes themselves as active participants in 
the process. However, this reaction and its link to positivist foundations is out of touch with 
empirical observations because replacing positivist foundations with a science of practical 
action and ethics will enhance scientific rigor and relevance rather than hinder them. 
In what follows, we argue for this proposition through a profound way to reconstruct 
quantitative inquiry. Taking a classical pragmatist approach to science (e.g., James, 1898, 
1907; Dewey, 1922, 1929; Mead, 1899, 1938), we eschew the idea that any foundations are 
indispensable except for scientific inquiry itself. Working with quantitative methods, any 
foundations researchers deploy should stand up to empirical scrutiny in the form of an 
investigation of their use. This approach emphasizes situated practical action, which engages 
with ethics via an interest in doing and studying research as work. 
 
A Pragmatist Approach to Empirical Inquiry 
In order to conduct scientific inquiry, we propose that researchers can follow a 
pragmatic method for testing theories and otherwise conducting research. This inquiry 
involves examining the practical effects of anything—theories, methods, hypotheses, or 
philosophical foundations—when put into practice (James, 1898, 1907). The idea is that “the 
chief function of [research] is not to find out what difference ready-made formulae make, if 
true, but to arrive at and to clarify their meaning as programs of behavior” (Dewey, 1916, p. 
312-313). The point is to continuously investigate the practical effects of different ways of 
talking, writing, and organizing human activity, so that the most contingently practical ways 
can be derived and then deployed where appropriate. Importantly, what is practical “may be 
aesthetic, or moral, or political, or religious in quality—anything you please. All that the 
theory requires is that they be in some way… acted upon” (Dewey, 1916, p. 330). 
With this approach, researchers can move beyond traditional tests of theory, on the 
terms of representation and correspondence, in order to test entire sets of foundationalist 
doctrines. This can be done by looking at what happens practically when researchers embody 
any logical scheme or other way of working as researchers. In this process, quantitative tools 
could be used, but a pragmatist approach can provide the necessary liberty for researchers 
who want to use any tools available to make a difference in the world but would otherwise 
have been constrained by positivist logic. Indeed, by focusing on the practical, a pragmatist 
way of doing science connects research to what matters to specific people doing specific 
things (Dewey, 1916; James, 1907), which should be central to any applied science. 
To allay the fears of positivists, here, we propose that researchers committed to 
empirical inquiry can appreciate a pragmatist approach because practical action requires 
rigorous empirical observation. Indeed, a pragmatist mantra is that foundations or theories 
that are contradicted by experience disrupt practical action (Dewey, 1920, 1922; James, 
1907). As with any work, the theories of researchers can only be practical when they achieve 
desired ends, and this is difficult when theories cannot describe and predict experience. 
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For example, a quantitative researcher evaluating a theory will put it to work in a 
process that involves objects of study, measures, data, statistics software, results, and 
interpretations that are coupled with all of these, authoring papers that attempt to clean up 
and package the mess that is research work (Collins, 1985; Shapin, 1989; Star, 1989; Star & 
Strauss, 1999). In this context, research is practical when substantive theories can be grafted 
onto the complex web of activities and objects involved in research work—aptly described by 
Pickering as ‘the mangle’ (1995). From an empirical perspective, key components are the 
data and the objects of study that were inquired about in the course of research. When data 
and results fit neatly into a researcher’s other activities, the researcher solves the problem of 
asking and answering a question on terms that will be understood by colleagues and lead to 
publication. When viewed this way, it seems that the point of research is always practical in 
some limited respects, meant to predict and produce specific experiences for researchers. Yet, 
of course, this process works not because the methods represent reality in a singularly true 
way, but instead because the complex collection, assemblage, or perhaps network of actions, 
discourses, environments, tools, objects, and the like fit together—yet always temporarily. 
 Such a pragmatist view of research jibes with a philosophy of science that describes 
how theories endure when they are useful for predicting and organizing experimental data, 
allowing the manipulation of phenomena (Hanson, 1958; Kuhn, 1961 1970a, 1970b). When 
theories fail at this task, researchers adjust their theories or tools to fit the practical demands 
of their research activities. Indeed, it seems that empirical researchers have been pragmatists 
of a sort all along: researchers attempt to predict, explain, and control various aspects of their 
experience, and when they fail, they adapt their theories and methods, never being inexorably 
wedded to any specific one (Kuhn, 1970b), perhaps apart from unnecessary ‘foundations’. 
By understanding what is practical as what works in research and other contexts, 
researchers can be empiricists while easily abandoning the positivist foundations we have 
critiqued. Indeed, organization researchers can focus on the aspects of empirical research 
which have proved its most useful component: organizing research work in ways that are 
practical. Specifically, for a pragmatist form of research that tests hypotheses, “[t]he highest 
criterion that we shall present is that the hypothesis shall work into the complex of forces into 
which we introduce it” (Mead, 1899: 369). This brings the entire enterprise of research from 
the lofty heights of abstraction down to the humble sites where actual research takes place. 
To be clear, the approach we are describing does not abstractly specify the objects 
that different disciplines will inquiry into, nor does it define a normative agenda for ethics 
through which practitioners of a discipline make decisions. In the absence of a disciplinary 
object (see du Gay & Vikkelsø, 2017) and a pragmatist ethics (e.g., Dewey, 1927, 1991; 
Dewey & Tufts, 1932), a focus on ‘the practical’ alone can become the kind of ‘anything 
goes’ relativism that Cortina (2019) and Edwards (2019) fear, and that Powell (2019) warns 
against. This leaves us with two questions that quantitative researchers must answer when 
doing their work, lest they be methods fetishists or an ‘anything goes’ community. First, what 
is their object of inquiry? Second, what work can organization research do? There are no 
ready-made answers to these questions precisely because if research is thought of as work, 
the work of answering these questions still needs to be done and answers will always be 
collectively agreements, ongoing, and contingent. 
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If positivists want nothing other than their work to uphold a doctrine while speaking 
to each other more than others, then the positivism we have critiqued coupled with 
quantitative methods do seem like a practical way to proceed. However, countless empirical 
observations and a range of debates about relevance show that this approach is not practical 
for a wide variety of other purposes, including engaging with worldly problems in relevant 
ways that take ethics seriously. Indeed, the positivism we identify too often produces an 
overly technical and insular way of doing quantitative work, leading many researchers to 
decry how an “emphasis on technical rigor has shifted our focus away from the soul of 
relevance and the applied nature of our field” (George, 2014: 1; amongst many others, see 
Amabile et al., 2001; Rynes, Bartunek, & Daft, 2001). 
A key part of this problem is that by focusing on foundational concepts such as 
objectivity or validity and technical logics that are supposed to achieve these (or guard 
against others such as chance or bias), researchers overlook the entire point of an applied 
science: to facilitate practical action that addresses problems of concern in ethical ways. A 
pragmatist approach makes this latter goal central to the practice of science, and therefore we 
propose that not only is pragmatism more defensible both theoretically and empirically, it is 
also better able to organize researchers around goals that should be central for an applied 
science. With a focus on practical action, a pragmatist approach engages with ethics in the 
manner which we introduced at the start of this paper. 
 
Implications for Future Research 
With our initial article (Zyphur & Pierides, 2017), we argued that commonly 
employed formulaic scripts for doing quantitative research—such as ‘best practices’ or ‘rules 
of thumb’—divorce research from ethics. We then encouraged researchers to bring a concern 
with ethics into the core of scientific practices. As a means for achieving this, we proposed a 
new tool that allows quantitative researchers to connect the purposes of their research with a 
researcher’s orientation and practices via ethics. We called this ‘relational validity’. The 
responses by Powell (2019), Edwards (2019) and Cortina (2019) to our initial article have 
allowed us to: 1) further clarify how the logic of statistics and probability—on which 
positivists such as Edwards and Cortina rely—came to be historically divorced from ethics 
(see companion article, Zyphur & Pierides, 2019); and, 2) show how the positivist separation 
of facts and values—which leads Cortina and Edwards to misunderstand our work—fails to 
provide adequate empirical evidence to substantiate its own claims, let alone critique ours.  
We had previously introduced relational validity as a tool, but as Powell (2019) 
suggests, we were not explicit enough about our philosophical background—what we meant 
by ‘purpose’ and how our pragmatism is an alternative to positivism not the source of our 
critique. By making this explicit, we have been able to: 3) provide further clarification about 
how we draw on classical pragmatism, thus ensuring that our discussion does not regress into 
the kind of misunderstandings that are evident in Edwards (2019) and Cortina (2019). We 
have: 4) proposed that quantitative researchers can start to think about their research practices 
as a kind of work. As a result, our present paper allows all organizational scholars to join us 
in shifting the discussion about quantitative research away from the empty cries of positivism 
about a supposed abstract ‘reality’ that may actually be seen as a set of ethics-laden practices 
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(e.g., ‘measurement’ or statistical ‘estimation’) with specific products, towards empirically 
grounded scientific inquiry that focuses on the ethics of actual people and such practices. 
This conclusion has much broader implications for reconstructing quantitative research than 
the specific pragmatist approach that we have recommended above. Therefore, we conclude 
by pointing to avenues for future research that may, or may not, follow our specific approach. 
Quantitative research as work. With the potential to ethically confront problems that 
matter for the human condition and our planet, the ‘black box’ of science (and philosophy) 
can be opened by investigating organizational research practices as a kind of work, as jobs 
done in relation to organizations (Latour, 1998), and as a way of life (cf. du Gay, 2015). 
Because any notion of reality enacted by researchers is tied to their activities and material 
environments, quantitative researchers can take the doing of work as a place to begin such 
inquiry. This move can also help organization researchers to study physics, philosophy, 
psychology, management, or any other activity as a form of organized work rather than 
feeling obligated to emulate the ways any of this work is done. 
In this pursuit, quantitative organization researchers can also investigate scientific 
ideals such as truth or objectivity, which always exist as words that organize socio-material 
activity in specific environments. Known in this way, the abstract reality often proposed for 
the kind of positivism that we have critiqued quickly condenses into a sea of heterogeneous 
techniques, actions, values, discourses, relationships, and disorganizations that evaporate 
only when workers reach what are temporary agreements about what they will call true, 
objective, or factual in specific circumstance for specific purposes (Latour & Woolgar, 1986). 
To guide inquiry, Hacking (2009) notes that studying research can involve “on the 
one hand, the study of mental capacities, and on the other, the history of civilizations and of 
their institutions” (p. 36). Conveniently, many organizational researchers are already 
prepared to investigate such heterogeneity by extending their existing work on decision-
making, creativity, and agreement versus conflict in teams (as in Shadish & Fuller, 1994). 
Alternatively, for inspiration organizational researchers might turn to sociologists who have 
already pioneered the investigation of research work (e.g., Garfinkel, Lynch, & Livingston, 
1981; Gieryn, 1983; Meyer, Boli, & Thomas, 1994; Meyer & Jepperson, 2000), including the 
use of numbers at work (e.g., Michaud, 2014; see also Desrosières, 1998; Poovey, 1998; 
Porter 1995; Shapin & Schaffer, 1985). In all cases, it will be crucial for quantitative 
organization researchers to remain aware of how their own work activities serve as ways of 
enacting the kinds of realities that they study (Willmott, 2011). 
To assist in this process, it will be useful to develop stronger links with the 
interdisciplinary field of science studies, which is “wholly compatible with pragmatism” 
(Shapin, 1995, p. 303) and has taken the lead in studying the work of researchers (e.g., Bloor, 
1991; Latour & Woolgar, 1986; Shapin, 2008; Star, 1983, 1985). Among other things, 
science studies offers many theoretical and empirical treatments of the links between science 
and society. By seeing such links, we expect that quantitative organizational researchers will 
be better placed to understand what they do as a form of work, in turn allowing them to draw 
on knowledge from their own field to understand themselves (see Casler & du Gay, 2019), 
and address worldly problems. 








For published version see: 
Zyphur, M. J., & Pierides, D. C. (2019). Making Quantitative Research Work: From Positivist Dogma to 
Actual Social Scientific Inquiry. Journal of Business Ethics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-019-04189-6  
The activities of quantitative research. Positivists whose work and logic we have 
scrutinized in this paper may be aided by recognizing how their goals are often oriented 
around seeking universals and timeless absolutes such as ‘objectivity’ while guarding against 
others such as ‘chance’ (as in Cortina & Landis, 2011; Edwards, 2011). Such concerns often 
limit quantitative researchers to studying phenomena in irrelevant ways by relying on simple 
mathematical models and requiring large sample sizes (McKelvey, 2006). To tackle problems 
worth caring about, these researchers should end their battle with ‘chance’ and the obsession 
with abstractions. Instead, they may be better served by moving the focus from statistical 
estimation of something they think is abstractly ‘true’, to a description or a statistical estimate 
that will be practical for motivating effective action in specific contexts. The implication is 
that, for researchers, the fight is not a skeptical one against chance or errors in inference 
regarding universal or abstract truths; the fight is a fallibilistic one against failures of action 
in specific material environments (Bernstein, 2010; Martela, 2015). 
Quantitative organizational researchers can address this problem of action by looking 
at what kind of work needs to be done in a specific context and figuring out how quantitative 
tools may be recruited to help (Coghlan, 2011; Van de Ven, 2007). For this, researchers will 
need to embrace complexity, perhaps by treating all statistics as descriptive rather than 
inferential. This will require skill in the craft of understanding the context associated with 
acts of quantitative description in order to predict the results of putting the descriptions into 
action to address specific and local problems (see Cartwright & Hardie, 2012; Reiss, 2009). 
This empirical pursuit is important because “[c]onsequences reveal unexpected potentialities 
in our habits whenever these habits are exercised in a different environment from that in 
which they were formed. The assumption of a stably uniform environment (even the 
hankering for one) expresses a fiction due to attachment to old habits” (Dewey, 1922, p. 51). 
For quantitative researchers interested in universals or absolutes, or estimating a ‘true’ 
parameter, a key message is that “[t]here is no such thing as an environment in general. There 
are specific changing objects and events,” and these can be acted on in more or less practical 
ways to create outcomes about which researchers may care (Dewey, 1922, p. 154). 
There is no magic bullet for bringing an imputed future into the present, and any 
supposed certainty generated by statistics or a dogmatic adherence to foundations cannot 
substitute for local knowledge of what may result from actions and their ethics, which can 
only be undertaken collectively in the here-and-now. What quantitative researchers can do is 
avoid the unnecessary mandate to start with positivist foundations of the type we have 
critiqued. Instead, “in pragmatism the path… leads in the opposite direction, to reflection 
upon the methods of science, in order to elucidate [their] practical character” (Joas, 1993, p. 
256). This will help orient the quantitative research community towards what we propose is 
its central task: 
“the task of stating definitely to itself what the ends are for which [its scientific] 
means shall be used… The wealth of means to accomplish our ends is compelling us 
to ask ourselves the embarrassing question what those ends are. The old formulas are 
no longer adequate… Self-control of the whole community can only be attained by the 
intelligent comprehension of the issues before it, and the wealth of means… is setting 
that goal concretely before us. We are coming nearer than ever before to 
understanding what is involved in providing the community with the goods it needs 
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for its life. In a word, science is enabling us to restate our ends by freeing us from 
slavery to the means and to traditional formulations of our ends.” (Mead, 1938, p. 
474). 
In order to make this happen, a new educational program will need to be introduced to 
the core of technical training for quantitative research. The exact details of what this looks 
like will need to be developed and researched with an eye towards what is practical and 
ethical, but central to the curriculum will need to be an understanding of social scientific 
inquiry, empirical history, ethics, and the formation of individual and collective character. 
For this, we have been clear that we would encourage a return to classical pragmatist texts 
that embody this pursuit (Dewey, 1927, 1991; Dewey & Tufts, 1932), but we would also 
strongly encourage our readers to explore other approaches that focus on ethics (e.g., du Gay, 
2015; Ezzamel & Willmott, 2014). As quantitative researchers begin to experiment through 
genuine inquiry into their own practices and the effects of these practices individually and 
collectively, these researchers will need to make many intelligent judgements. The kinds of 
people who are able to do this must be educated, not just technically trained, so that they can 
take their task more seriously than those who suppose their job is just one of representing a 
singular abstract ‘reality’ or getting singularly ‘true’ statistical estimates by using procedures 
they have developed for themselves. Overcoming such simple-minded, historically ignorant, 
and quite frankly unscientific pursuits is a goal about which we can be hopeful for the future 
of science and the forms of expertise it allows. Indeed, we audaciously foresee a future 
wherein the researchers who bang the drum of positivism are outnumbered by those who 
have been waiting for the opportunity to do things better from the standpoint of ethics. 
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